In short, expectancies continue to mold perceptual organization in a self-sustaining fashion so long as they are confirmed. Perceptual expectancies, whether realistic or wishful, continue to operate so long as they are reinforced by the outcome of events. One sees softness of the skin, loftiness of brow, lightness of step - but perception of certain physical flaws does not materialize. The construction-defense balance operates along other lines. His perceptual expectancies, so to speak, are elsewhere. Similarly, although it is the other side of the coin of "realism," one smitten by love does rather poorly in perceiving the linear characteristics of his beloved. Rather, in his perception, the dangers ahead may be sharpened and emphasized. While directive factors do operate in the interests of locomotion, the skier on the trail does not organize the distant steep hillside in a manner which would make his own path seem less steep and hazardous. The construction-defense process operates where expectations are "realistic" or where they are "wishful." In the former case, it is simply a matter of "constructing" a percept which is relevant, say, to the exigencies of locomotion, "defending" against percepts which, though potentially wish-fulfilling, are disruptive to the task of locomotion. By "wishful" we mean an expectation with a low probability of being confirmed by events. "Wishfulness" has to do with the nature of the expectations which are at work and is not a term relevant to the perceiving process as such. This "minimax" axiom we have referred to elsewhere as the construction-defense balance in perceiving ( 1).Īll of which is not to say that perception is always wishful or "autistic." Indeed, that is not the point. A second axiom concerns the operation of such directive factors: given a stimulus input of certain characteristics, directive processes in the organism operate to organize the perceptual field in such a way as to maximize percepts relevant to current needs and expectations and to minimize percepts inimical to such needs and expectations. Our basic axiom has already been stated - that perceiving is a process which results from the stimulation of a prepared or eingestellt organism. The present study, though empirical in nature, is essentially an essay in the theory of perception - or at least that part of the theory of perception which deals with directive factors in the perceiving process. For it has prevented the emergence of new hypotheses which, flowing even from premature principles, might serve to test the utility of theories of perception. That students of nonsensory or "directive" factors in perception have thus far refrained from any large-scale statement of principles, while it is a mark of admirable modesty in the face of a very confusing array of experimental data, is highly regrettable. There have been very few systematic efforts to analyze the dimensions of set and to formulate laws regarding the effectiveness of set in perception such as those which describe stimulus-perception relationships. If we sometimes, in simple sensory experiments, fail to do so, the reason is not that we do not care about the attitude of the organism but, rather, that we take it for granted that the observer is attentive to the task and that he is seeking to judge in terms of some required sensory dimension and not some other. And so, in many situations the student of perception must also specify the expectancies of the organism when exposed to stimulation. It is a truism worth repeating that the perceptual effect of a stimulus is necessarily dependent upon the set or expectancy of the organism. The organism in perception is in one way or another in a state of expectancy about the environment. There is never, in the old-fashioned language of G. Stimuli, however, do not act upon an indifferent organism. This first set of specifications we are used to calling "stimulus" factors. This is done either in terms of physical measures such as wave length, or in terms of psychological norms such as in the description of a picture as that picture is seen by "normal" observers under optimal conditions and with a set for accuracy. One set describes the conditions of stimulation. For under all conditions, perceiving represents a resultant of two complex sets of specifications. Perceiving, for all its nicety of functioning in the dark room under strict instructions for accuracy, comprises a highly complex series of little understood psychological processes. On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigmįirst published in Journal of Personality, 18, 206-223. Classics in the History of Psychology - Bruner & Postman (1949)
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